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NAVIGATING THE SPACE BETWEEN DUELING SOVEREIGNS 
Miriam Galston
*
 
In Divided Loyalties: The Problem of “Dual Sovereignty” 
and Constitutional Faith,1 Sanford Levinson reflects on the problems 
posed in the United States of America and elsewhere when a person 
of faith must choose between two sovereigns.2  This can occur when 
a sovereign commands the faithful to act unjustly or when an obser-
vant adherent of a religion is asked by civil law to act in a manner 
contrary to the precepts of her faith.3  Levinson‟s illustration of the 
latter is the town clerk in upstate New York who was unwilling to 
give a marriage certificate to a same-sex couple because of the 
clerk‟s religious beliefs opposing non-traditional religious marriages.4  
Conflicts of this kind are not isolated occurrences, unfortunately.  
Some employers connected to the Catholic Church, for example, are 
unwilling to finance health insurance that covers contraception,5 and 
some pharmacists will not dispense “morning-after” or even regular 
birth control pills because they might induce a woman to abort a ferti-
lized egg.6  Levinson is also concerned about divided loyalties that do 
not involve religious beliefs, but arise from deeply held moral or oth-
er convictions.7
 
 What these situations have in common from the 
perspective of individuals is the conflict that necessarily accompanies 
 
                                                                                                                                       
* Associate Professor, The George Washington University Law School. 
1 Sanford Levinson, Divided Loyalties: The Problem of “Dual Sovereignty” and Constitu-
tional Faith, 29 TOURO L. REV. 241 (2013). 
2 Id. at 241, 243. 
3 Id. at 245, 248-49. 
4 Id. at 252-53. 
5 See George L. Blum, Annotation, Application of First Amendment‟s “Ministerial Excep-
tion” or “Ecclesiastical Exception” to State Civil Rights Claims, 53 A.L.R. 6th 569, § 6 
(2010) (discussing the conflict experienced by religious employers). 
6 See Diana Snyder, Note and Comment, A Reasonable Time, Place and Manner Restric-
tion:  Medicare Reimbursement Law Should Require Pharmacists to Fill Prescriptions Re-
gardless of Personal Beliefs, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 652, 655-56 (2010). 
7 Levinson, supra note 1, at 248-49. 
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an attempt to keep the faith with each of the competing authorities or, 
alternatively, a desire to mute the claims of one authority so as to 
give full allegiance to the other. 
Levinson‟s remarks seem aimed less at resolving such con-
flicts than suggesting how we should think about the structure of the 
problems that arise when competing authorities vie for our loyalty, 
with at least one of them asserting a sacred or transcendent basis for 
its claims.8  He adopts what can be called a “meta” approach to what 
he calls “meta-issues.”9  This can be seen by the fact that his reflec-
tions contain no specific proposals to resolve the dilemma of divided 
loyalties for the audience or reader to consider, much less adopt.  Ra-
ther, he describes two extreme responses to the problem: Justice 
Brennan‟s complete subordination of his religious beliefs to his civic 
obligations as a Supreme Court Justice, and Justice Scalia‟s claim 
that he would resign from the Supreme Court if presented with a ge-
nuine conflict between binding Catholic doctrine and binding United 
States law.10 
In general, Levinson expresses a preference for Justice Bren-
nan‟s substantive readings of the Constitution, but he queries whether 
he should prefer Justice Scalia instead when it comes to “the ways 
that the two justices confronted the interplay of their religious and se-
cular commitments.”11  This question invites analysis.  Justice Sca-
lia‟s response to the conflict calls to mind “The Akeda” of Genesis 
22:1-19, because of its portrayal of unquestioning obedience to what 
appears to be an immoral or unjust religious command, i.e., to kill an 
innocent child.12
 
 In an article written in 2002, Justice Scalia dis-
cussed the reasons for his opinion that the United States Constitution 
does not prohibit capital punishment.13  He observed that the recently 
published encyclical Evangelium Vitae adopts the position that capi-
tal punishment is never warranted to effect just retribution.  It is also 
 
                                                                                                                                       
8 See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH, 9-16 (rev. ed. 2011) (describing Le-
vinson‟s belief that, in some respects, the United States Constitution serves as a sacred doc-
ument for Americans and that their faith in its teachings exhibits many of the characteristics 
of religious faith rather than belief in man-made positive law, potentially deepening the con-
flict engendered by divided political and religious loyalties, since both sovereigns make 
claims to transcendent authority). 
9 Levinson, supra note 1, at 241. 
10 Id. at 255. 
11 Id. at 256. 
12 The Akeda, Genesis 22:1-19 [hereinafter Genesis]. 
13 Antonin Scalia, God‟s Justice & Ours, FIRST THINGS, May 2002, at 17. 
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not necessary to defend society because modern forms of incarcera-
tion make capital punishment unnecessary.  Thus, the encyclical has 
the practical effect of making the Catholic Church opposed to capital 
punishment.  Luckily for Justice Scalia, he has it on good authority 
that the Church‟s new position is not binding upon practicing Catho-
lics14
 
because, if it were, he says he would be forced to resign from 
the Supreme Court, given his understanding that the United States 
Constitution permits capital punishment.  Justice Scalia‟s assertion of 
the need to resign, were religious doctrine to contradict what he un-
derstands as the Constitution‟s view of capital punishment, thus de-
pends upon his belief in the absolute priority of a binding religious 
commitment over contrary civil obligations and his concomitant wil-
lingness to submit his will to God‟s—both of which responses are 
displayed by Abraham in “The Akeda.”15 
Justice Brennan‟s response to the dilemma of dual sovereigns 
is actually just as unyielding as Scalia‟s, although he grants absolute 
priority to the demands of the political sovereign rather than the reli-
gious one.16  This position is dubious because it presupposes that he 
could interpret the Constitution with a disembodied mind wholly in-
dependent of the man inside the black robes who was shaped, in part, 
by Catholic teachings.17  The reader may be suspicious of the claims 
of both Justices, then, although for different reasons, and one won-
ders if Levinson‟s goal in mentioning only these two views is to point 
to the need for us to consider arguably less principled, or less dog-
matic, responses to the problem of divided loyalties, i.e., responses 
that foresee some balancing of the claims of the competing authori-
ties. 
Another indication of Levinson‟s “meta” approach is that he 
implies that there is a distinction between the way we should think 
about dueling sovereigns in a country with a settled legal regime, like 
the United States, and one in which a constitutional document re-
mains to be written, as is the case in Israel.  From one perspective, 
creating a constitution affords greater flexibility than amending one, 
or otherwise navigating the shoals of existing competing sovereigns, 
 
                                                                                                                                       
14 Id. at 21. 
15 Levinson, supra note 1, at 245-46; Genesis, supra note 12. 
16 Levinson, supra note 1, at 256. 
17 See id. at 253-54 (referring to Justice Brennan‟s Catholic faith); but see Scalia, supra 
note 13, at 18 (referring to the fact that he is “unable to jump out of my [Roman Catholic] 
skin” when discussing the morality of the death penalty). 
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because creation can provide the occasion for rational reflection 
about the aspirations of a particular community and the best means to 
achieve them.  Although the creation of a constitution in Israel would 
hardly be working off a “clean slate,” it would obviously lack centu-
ries of precedents and jurisprudence restricting the content that could 
or could not be included in a constitutional framework.  Israel could 
also learn from developments in international law since World War 
II, when many nations have attempted to incorporate constitutional 
protections for religion and for minority populations in greater detail 
and in different ways than was done in the United States more than 
two centuries ago.  If there are solutions to divided loyalties, in other 
words, they may be context specific, i.e., responsive to the stage of 
development of the society, the degree of heterogeneity of its popula-
tion, the nature of their traditions, and, especially, the specific claims 
of potential dueling sovereigns.  In the United States, for example, 
which assigns a very high value to individual freedom and religious 
and cultural tolerance, the best approach is likely to differ from the 
best approach in a nation that values shared community norms above 
all or that has a population with only a few ethnic or religious back-
grounds. 
On the deepest level, the dilemma for Levinson is about the 
faith of individuals, especially the meaning of faith when a person of 
faith is subject to dual or dueling sovereigns.  To generalize from the 
specific instances he relates, he wonders whether a person of faith 
can compartmentalize his or her moral nature or relegate it to the pri-
vate sphere in order to remain part of a political community that per-
mits, and even perpetuates, ongoing or systemic injustices.  Although 
the conflict between one‟s religious and one‟s political loyalties is the 
most obvious and, perhaps, the most common case of such conflicts, 
for Levinson the dilemma of faith goes beyond religious faith and en-
compasses all deeply held convictions of a fundamental kind.18  Is the 
stance of Justice Marshall in Antelope,19 placing positive law above 
 
                                                                                                                                       
18 In addition to the Akeda of Genesis, Levinson mentions several United States Supreme 
Court decisions that pit two political sovereigns against one another, see, e.g., Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV (a political sovereign against norms of justice); Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 
Wheat.) 66 (1825) (a political sovereign against moral norms of the natural law); McCulloch 
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) 
(a political sovereign against transcendent norms). 
19 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825). 
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the claims of morality, or that of Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott v. 
Sandford,20 similarly disregarding the claim of justice over positive 
law, permissible because of their roles as judges sworn to enforce the 
law of the land?  Would a citizen be similarly obliged, or could she 
rightfully claim to follow the dictates of her faith because of her sta-
tus as an individual?  And does her faith require her to take an active 
stand against injustice wherever and whenever she encounters it in 
order to be a person of faith, real faith, in accordance with her reli-
gious or moral commitments? 
Levinson provides no answers to these dilemmas.  An air of 
pessimism pervades his remarks.  He might have noted recent efforts 
by persons of faith to hold their religious beliefs to the standards of 
their morality.  For example, some observant Jews have worked suc-
cessfully for the creation of new kosher certifications that attest to the 
sound ecological and labor practices of purveyors of kosher food as 
well as to the strictness of their food processing or slaughtering prac-
tices.21  Others have established new Orthodox congregations that en-
large the role of women in prayer services based upon distinguishing 
the dictates of Rabbinic texts from traditions adopted by Orthodox 
Jewry while living in male-dominated societies (e.g., the Shira Hada-
sha movement in Jerusalem, Israel, and elsewhere).22  For some 
people, efforts of this kind set the standard of real faith because they 
combine the demands of one‟s ritual observance and one‟s indepen-
dent moral judgments.23  For others, this standard more correctly 
complies with the strictures of the Torah itself.24  For the latter, prop-
erly understood religious texts contain many of the precepts of moral 
philosophy, such as dignified treatment of workers, so there is noth-
ing to harmonize.25  Still, for others, however, a person‟s independent 
 
                                                                                                                                       
20 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV. 
21 Sue Fishkoff, The Changing Notion of Kosher, JTA (Oct. 29, 2006), 
http://www.jta.org/news/article/2006/10/29/14609/Dietarychangesafoo. 
22 Julie Rapoport, The Orthodox Egalitarian Minyan: An Analysis of Women and Public 
Torah Reading, HASHTA, https://sites.google.com/site/hashtaumd/contents-1/minyan (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2013); Inclusive Halakhic Minyanim, SHIRA HADASHA, 
http://www.shirahadasha.com/Shira_Hadasha/Welcome.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) [he-
reinafter SHIRA HADASHA]. 
23 SHIRA HADASHA, supra note 22. 
24 Rapoport, supra note 22. 
25 See Reuven Hammer, Tradition Today: The Wages of a Laborer, THE JERUSALEM POST: 
MAG. (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.jpost.com/Magazine/Judaism/Article.aspx?id=245992 
(stating that “proper treatment of the poor and of all workers” is fundamental to a Jewish so-
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moral imperatives constitute a second sovereign, and for them, as for 
Levinson, the conflict is deeply felt.26 
Interestingly, Levinson admits to us that he likes to feel the 
conflict.  He tells us that the Reform Jewish service, which sanitizes 
“The Akeda” story in Genesis, is not satisfying.27  The reason seems 
to be that he—and perhaps we—need to be reminded of moral di-
lemmas that are ever present in our lives and that should challenge 
our complacency or submission to the will of the political sovereign.  
It is not unreasonable for some to view newspaper stories about de-
portation of illegal aliens and their birthright citizen children as mod-
ern day equivalents of the expulsion of Hagar.28  Immigration policy 
is the most obvious modern equivalent, but the nation‟s treatment of 
the poor, disabled, and otherwise disadvantaged also does not seem 
very far afield.  And, at times, the United States government asks its 
citizens to put unquestioning trust in its judgment, even in matters of 
life or death.  In short, what Levinson calls “the „state project‟ ” is 
“self-consciously idolatrous” when it seeks “the unconditional com-
mitments formerly pledged to a divinity.”29  It follows that certain 
contemporary conditions should be seen as creating many of the di-
lemmas caused by claims of competing sovereigns, even if the gov-
ernment does not ask for the sacrifice of our first born.  Levinson‟s 
criticism, in these remarks and elsewhere, of the great “veneration” 
typically accorded the United States Constitution is, in part, ad-
dressed to this problem.30  Because of his assessment of the United 
States Constitution‟s defects and the defects of the legal system it 
spawned, he seeks to undermine the power of its claim to the unquali-
fied loyalty of its citizens.  Hopefully, then, publicizing the United 
States Constitution‟s defects will have the consequence of helping 
Americans see clearly the exact nature of their dilemma, by forcing 
them to examine critically the exaggerated claims sometimes made 
concerning the wisdom of the constitutional foundation of the United 
States.  If Levinson is right, then perhaps the town clerk is also right 
in concluding that the claims of religion have priority over the claims 
of a very imperfect political regime, especially if they are the good 
 
ciety). 
26 Levinson, supra note 1, at 245. 
27 Id.; see Genesis, supra note 12. 
28 Genesis 16:6-9. 
29 Levinson, supra note 1, at 251. 
30 Id. at 242. 
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claims of a good religion.31  The competing sovereigns, in that event, 
are not in fact equivalent, and our divided loyalties can be safely di-
vided to the extent that the claims of the sovereigns can be ranked. 
How dual or multiple sovereigns challenge an individual‟s 
faith (or faiths) is thus central to Levinson‟s personal and profession-
al doubts.  It is not, however, the sole concern of his reflections in 
this volume, or in his life as a Jew.  As noted earlier, he is deeply, 
viscerally concerned about the moral, political, and social dilemmas 
posed by the need for peaceful coexistence among the Orthodox Jew-
ish, non-Orthodox Jewish, and non-Jewish citizens of the State of 
Israel.  Increasingly, a barely suppressed civil war is simmering be-
tween Orthodox and other Jewish citizens of the State, triggered by 
disputes over seemingly secular topics such as educational policy, 
women‟s rights, transportation, and even parking, in addition to more 
recognizably religious conflicts, such as who can marry, divorce, or 
be buried in Israel.32
 
 Settlements on the West Bank, the Green Line, 
and the treatment of Arab Israelis span the religious and the political, 
which cannot really be separated in practice in Israel because the 
State holds itself out as, and intends to remain, a Jewish state.33
 
 Le-
vinson‟s frequent trips to Israel have increased his apprehension over 
the complex and possibly intractable nature of these conflicts.  
Israel‟s aspiration to be, and to remain, a democracy only accentuates 
the cross-cutting nature of the State‟s competing commitments and 
the citizens‟ dueling loyalties.34 
For reasons that are not clear, Levinson appears to desire that 
Israel obtain a written constitution.  At present, Israel has eleven “Ba-
 
                                                                                                                                       
31 See id. at 252 (illustrating the conflict between sovereigns as experienced by a town 
clerk who refused to compromise her religious beliefs). 
32 See, e.g., Ofrit Liviatan, Judicial Activism and Religion-based Tensions in India and 
Israel, 26 ARIZ. J. INT‟L & COMP. L. 583, 605-60 (2009); Ethan Bronner & Isabel Kershner, 
Israeli Women Core of Debate on Orthodoxy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2012, at A1; Aron Heller, 
Israeli Draft Pits Secular Jews vs. ultra-Orthodox, YAHOO! NEWS (July 7, 2012), 
http://news.yahoo.com/israeli-draft-pits-secular-jews-vs-ultra-orthodox-071228668.html 
(discussing the conflict created by the exemption of ultra-Orthodox from military service); 
IRAC (Israel Religious Action Center)-Fighting Gender Segregation on Public Buses (IRAC 
versus the Ministry of Transportation, Egged and Dan Bus Companies), 
http://www.irac.org/LegalWork.aspx?SubheadingID=66 (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (de-
scribing organization‟s fight against attempts to force gender segregation in seating on public 
buses). 
33 The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR., 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/Dec_of_Indep.html (last visited Feb. 17, 
2013). 
34 See id. (proclaiming freedom and equality to all inhabitants). 
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sic Laws” and two additional legislative enactments that are consi-
dered to be superior to ordinary legislation.35  Some Israelis believe 
that these laws, combined with Israeli Supreme Court rulings, amount 
to an adequate constitutional foundation for the country‟s legal sys-
tem.36  Others believe there is a need for a more conventional docu-
ment, as exists in most developed nations, and for a clearer statement 
of rights than is contained in the basic and constitutional legislation.37  
Levinson notes Arye Carmon‟s description of the two-year attempt 
by representatives of both Orthodox and non-Orthodox Jewish com-
munities to agree on a constitution, an effort that failed because of an 
inability of the various stakeholders to compromise on certain is-
sues.38  He also quotes Yitzhak Meir Levi, who observed that people 
are simply unable to compromise “the moment the issue touches 
upon the foundations of their faith.”39  There is no lack of evidence 
that, in the present environment, there exists little inclination to com-
promise, especially on the part of certain groups of Orthodox and ul-
tra-Orthodox Jews.  In the face of these facts, Levinson asks if there 
are any “materials internal to Jewish law that might help persuade 
devout Jews . . . to engage in the kinds of compromises thought ne-
cessary” to reach agreement on a constitution for all the citizens of 
Israel.40 
Levinson would do well to look to a different set of political 
and legal materials for help, namely, those of the United States.  Le-
vinson himself observes that the ugly constitutional compromise of 
1786, which protected slavery for more than a generation, was a “rot-
 
                                                                                                                                       
35 Daniel J. Elazar, The Constitution of the State of Israel, JERUSALEM CENTER FOR PUB. 
AFF., http://jcpa.org/dje/articles/const-intro-93.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2013). 
36 See generally Joshua Segev, Who Needs a Constitution? In Defense of the Non-decision 
Constitution-making Tactic in Israel, 70 ALB. L. REV. 409 (2007). 
37 See, e.g., Tony Bayfield,  A Jewish Response to a Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, 
THE MOVEMENT FOR REFORM JUDAISM (June 18, 2009),  
http://news.reformjudaism.org.uk/assembly-of-rabbis/a-jewish-response-to-a-bill-of-rights-
and-responsibilities.html (quoting Chief Justice Aharon Barak: “From the Declaration of In-
dependence we learn that Israel is to be built on the principles of freedom, justice and peace 
and the social and political equality of all its citizens”) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
Arye Carmon, First Word: Give Israel a Constitution, THE JERUSALEM POST (June 8, 2006), 
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Article.aspx?id=24282 (illustrating the benefits 
of a written constitution). 
38 Levinson, supra note 1, at 259-62. 
39 Id. at 260. 
40 Id. at 261. 
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ten compromise,”41 but one that made possible a country that, in the 
twenty-first century, could be headed by an African-American Presi-
dent.  He omits to mention that it was still necessary to wage a civil 
war and to progress incrementally after that war for almost one hun-
dred and fifty years before this “miracle” in the United States could 
occur.  What could the Israeli analogue to this sequence of events 
possibly be?  Surely no one wants a rotten compromise, in which the 
more tolerant segments of Israeli society surrender more than the less 
tolerant, making a rotten civil war inevitable if democracy for non-
Orthodox Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs is to be attained.  But the 
more tolerant would have to surrender more to the less tolerant be-
cause the less tolerant have piety, that is, faith in divine texts, to but-
tress their view of good government.  One important reason that 
Israel did not adopt a written constitution at its inception is that some 
of the Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox Jews would not agree to have a 
secular law with precedence over the Torah and Talmud.42  Since the 
Jewish religion, unlike the Christian faith, dictates to its adherents 
their conduct for all matters in their daily lives, not just in their spiri-
tual lives, it dictates such things as what food Jews can eat, what 
clothes they can wear or combine, how much of a field can be har-
vested and in what years, and, apparently, who has to sit at the back 
of the bus.43
 
 It is true that the Jewish religion requires such things as 
the fair treatment of strangers and workers.44  Yet some of its pre-
cepts are inconsistent with the rights that Israel is arguably committed 
to secure.  Even the Jewish principle of compromise, “dina de-
malkhuta dina, „the law of the land is the law,‟ ” does not seem use-
ful, since it requires Jews to recognize the practical necessity of obey-
 
                                                                                                                                       
41 See AVISHAI MARGALIT, ON COMPROMISE AND ROTTEN COMPROMISES 1, 54-61 (2010) 
(Levinson attributes this phrase to Avishai Margolit, and Margolit attributes it to Albert 
Einstein); Geoff Nunberg, What the Word „Compromise‟ Really Means, NAT‟L PUB. RADIO 
(July 19, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/07/19/138468870/what-the-word-compromise-
really-means. 
42 Elazar, supra note 35. 
43 See, e.g., Deuteronomy 22:11 (describing the prohibition against mixing wool and linen 
(shatnez)); Exodus 23:10-11, Leviticus 25:1-7 (describing the limits on harvesting (shmiteh); 
Joshua Mitnick, From Back of the Bus, Israeli Women Fight Segregation, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 
5, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204368104577136253309226604.html  
(describing the controversy over seating on buses); Christina Soranno & Kim Sondey, Or-
thodox Jews: A Cultural Profile, ORTHODOX JUDAISM (Feb. 25, 2012), http://www.orthodox-
jews.com/jews.html#axzz209rrFTdt (describing some of the religious mandates that influ-
ence daily life). 
44 Hammer, supra note 25. 
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ing the law of a foreign country unless that law contradicts a precept 
of the Torah.45
 
 In Israel, which is a Jewish State, such compromise is 
irrelevant.46  Indeed, one could argue that dina de-malkhuta dina im-
plies that when the Jews are in their own homeland, compromise re-
lating to Jewish law is prohibited. 
One part of the compromise adopted in 1786 in the United 
States should nonetheless be seen as a model for constitutional com-
promise in Israel.  Levinson cites Justice Holmes‟ statement that con-
stitutions are “made for people of fundamentally differing views.”47  
Levinson then observes that “this reality is probably the best explana-
tion for that particular form of government we call „federalism,‟ 
whether in the United States or elsewhere.”48  Federalism succeeds 
because it acknowledges the diversity of sometimes incompatible 
claims made by members, or potential members, of some kind of po-
litical unity.49  Federalism gives those competing claims the widest 
possible berth consistent with maintaining a country unified when 
and where necessary.  One could argue that Israel is already this kind 
of federation, based upon the facts on the ground, because in areas 
other than national security, neither the secular nor the religious 
community consistently dominates.  Although the relationships 
among the parties are dynamic and, in many respects, fragile, it is 
doubtful that attempting to force a consensus for a constitution that 
would delineate these relationships in a fixed way would contribute 
to greater stability.  On the contrary, such an effort is almost certain 
to make the underlying conflicts more urgent and vivid in the public 
mind. 
To reduce (no one is talking about eliminating) the tensions 
among the component parts, it is necessary to recognize their distinc-
tive loyalties and agree on the least onerous set of regulations to en-
sure that the country is united when and where it needs to be.  To a 
 
                                                                                                                                       
45 See Russell G. Pearce, To Save a Life: Why a Rabbi and a Jewish Lawyer Must Dis-
close a Client Confidence, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1771, 1773-74 (1996). 
46 See Eetta Prince-Gibson, Progressive Rabbis Urge Greater Tolerance, THE JERUSALEM 
POST, Nov. 12, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 19687508 (quoting Aharon Barak, President 
of the Supreme Court of Israel, who stated that Israel is a Jewish State and must abide by 
“the values of a Jewish state”). 
47 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); LEVINSON, su-
pra note 8, at 72. 
48 Levinson, supra note 1, at 257-58. 
49 See Mark Tushnet, What Then Is the American?, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 873, 879 (1996) (ex-
plaining that the success of federalism is due to the existence of value pluralism). 
10
Touro Law Review, Vol. 29 [2013], No. 2, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss2/4
2013] NAVIGATING THE SPACE 273 
certain approximation, this is what Israel already has accomplished.  
It has enacted basic laws which protect many of the categories of 
rights that could reasonably be included in a constitution.50  The 
courts in Israel treat the basic laws as foundational, and the Israeli 
Supreme Court has famously used them to resolve some disputes in 
favor of minorities and other powerless claimants.51  The courts could 
do much more, but their failure to be more protective probably cannot 
be attributed to the lack of a constitution. 
In short, Israel does not need a constitution right now.  
Whether rotten or not, its patchwork of basic laws and judicial inter-
pretations is likely the best compromise possible in the present cir-
cumstances.  Levinson would do well to remember the lesson of Ba-
ba Metzia,52 that “[t]he Torah is not in heaven,” and cease yearning 
for a perfection that exceeds the limits of the possible.53 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
50 See Daphne Barak-Erez, Law and Religion Under the Status Quo Model: Between Past 
Compromises and Constant Change, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2495, 2497 (2009) (including the 
Hours of Work and Rest Law of 1951, which “recognized the Sabbath as the official day of 
rest in the country,” or the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law of 
1953, which established a monopoly of Jewish law for marriage or divorce). 
51 See Larry Derfner, The Jewish Tradition of Aharon Barak, JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 14, 
2006, available at 2006 WLNR 16127764 (explaining that “if not for the Israeli Supreme 
Court under Barak, Arabs-Israeli citizens and Palestinians both - would be subject to mal-
treatment”). 
52 Babylonian Talmud, Baba Metzia 59b. 
53 Levinson, supra note 1, at 243 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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